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NOTES
ALIENABILITY OF FUTURE INTERESTS IN TENNESSEE
One of the most technical problems in the field of property law is the
manner in which future interests in realty and personalty may be alienated.
The term, future interest, is used here to mean a presently existing interest
which is deprived of possession but which looks forward to possession in the
future. The term is a misnomer. Such an interest is "future" only in the
sense that it looks toward becoming possessory in the future. Just as future
interests is a law of words, so the alienability of future interests is, in the
absence of statute, a law of methods. The initial problem is to classify the
interest. Only then can the proper methods of alienation be brought into play.
At least 33 states have statutes which either expressly or impliedly provide
for the transfer of these interests.' But in many states there are no statutes
and the common law or more modern judicial decisions control.
It is the purpose of this Note to discuss two problems: (1) the voluntary or consensual inter vivos conveyance of future interests, and (2) the
rights of creditors to seize these interests under judicial process in satisfaction of a debt. Particular emphasis will be placed on Tennessee law. But
in order to understand the law of Tennessee in these problems and to point
out possible future development in this state, it is necessary to consider in
addition both the early common law decisions and recent developments in
other states.
Statutes. By statute the English common law has been abrogated in that
country and all future interests are transferrable into vivos.2

In the United

States there are three types of statutes bearing upon the question of alienability. Some of these lay down a broad general rule that all future interests
may be conveyed inter vivos. The New York Real Property Law is typical.
It declares that "An expectant estate is descendible, devisable and alienable,
in the same manner as an estate in possession."'4 This statute and those
like it appear to abrogate any common law dogma denying the alienation of
future interests. Perhaps the one exception would be the right of re-entry for
condition broken. In some jurisdictions there are statutes referring to
1. See

RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY

§ 162 (Supp. 1948). Some of the statutes here

listed have been held not to include certain contingent future interests.
2. 8 & 9 Vicr. c. 106, § 6 re-enacted in Law of Property Act, 1925, 15 Gro. V,
c. 20, § 4(2).
3. See, e.g., ARiz. CoDE ANN. § 71-105 (1939); GA. CODE ANN. § 29-103 (1933);
Micir. STAT. ANN. § 26.35 (1937).
, 4. NY. REAL PROP. LAW § 59.
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specific types of future interests. 5 Still a third type are those general con-

veyancing acts which make no particular reference to future interests but
which have been interpreted so as to bring certain ones within their scope.8

I. VOLUNTARY INTER Vivos TRANSFERS
1. Vested Remainders and Reversions
A vested remainder is a presently existing interest in property created
in a person other than the grantor which is deprived of immediate possession because of the existence of a preceding estate created by the same
instrument and which is not subject to any condition precedent other than
the termination of the prior estate. It is an estate in property in contradistinction to the mere possibility of having an estate. Vested remainders were
freely alienable at common law and are everywhere recognized today as being
capable of inter vivos transfer. 7 This rule applies both to indefeasibly
vested remainders and to remainders vested subject to divestment. 8 The
result is reached without the aid of statute since the vested remainder is a
true estate just as a fee simple or a life estate. No distinction is made between realty and personalty today.
A reversion is that portion of an estate retained by the grantor, either
expressly or by operation of law, when he creates an estate of less quantity
than that which he has. For example, if A, the owner'of the fee, conveys a
life estate or an estate for years to B, A retains, by operation of law, a reversion which is a presently existing right in the property that is deprived
of possession because of the existence of the lessor estate. A reversion is a
vested estate and like the vested remainder, it has always been considered
freely alienable. 9 As early as 1833 the Supreme Court of Tennessee held
that a lessor may sell his reversionary interest, 10 and subsequent Tennessee
cases have recognized this principle."
5. See, e.g., ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 47, § 13 (1940); MASS. ANN. LAws c. 184,

§ 2 (1933); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 3 (1930).
6. See, e.g., Ky. STAT. ANN. § 2341 (Carroll 1936). See also Lindenberger v.
Cornell, 190 Ky. 844, 229 S.W. 54 (1921) (contingent remainder); Stallcup v. Crowley's
Trustee, 117 Ky. 547, 78 S.W. 441 (1904) (executory interest).
7. Greer v. Parker, 209 Ark. 553, 191 S.W.2d 584 (1946); DeVane v. Young,
154 Ga. 832, 115 S.E. 661 (1923) ; Baley v. Strahan, 314 Ill. 213, 145 N.E. 359 (1924) ;
Thurston v. Buxton, 218 Ind. 585, 34 N.E.2d 549 (1941) ; Fulton v. Taeger, 183 Ky.
381, 209 S.W. 535 (1919); Lockwood & Co. v. Nye, 32 Tenn. 307 (1852); Kelly v.
Morgan's Lessee, 11 Tenn. 347 (1832).
8. 3 SlmEs, FuTURE INTERESTS § 711 (1936).

9. Wilson v. Pharris, 203 Ark. 614, 158 S.W.2d 274 (1942); Gridley v. Gridley,
399 Ill. 215, 77 N.E.2d 146 (1948). See also Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co. v. Harloff,
133 N.J.Eq. 44, 30 A.2d 57 (Ch. 1943).
10. Marley v. Rodgers, 13 Tenn. 180 (1833).
11. Manhattan Savings Bank & Trust Co. v. Bedford, 161 Tenn. 187, 30 S.W.2d
227 (1930); Robinson v. Blankenship, 116 Tenn. 394, 92 S.W. 854 (1906); Clopton
v. Clopton, 49 Tenn. 31 (1870). See also Wiley v. Bridgman, 38 Tenn. 39 (858).
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2. Contingent Remainders and Executory Interests
The English common law refused to allow contingent remainders and
executory interests to be transferred inter vivos. 12 They were looked upon not
as estates but as more expectancies or possibilities. To allow transfers of these
possibilities amounted to little more than buying and selling lawsuits, to
the English judges, who abhorred such practices and treated them as
champertous. It was in this atmosphere that the common law rule developed.
But the ingenuity of English conveyancers, coupled with a desire on the
part of many judges to keep land titles free from possibilities and contingencies, gave rise to three well recognized exceptions to the rule. In
Lainpet's Case,13 the court indicated that such interests could be released tO
the owner of the possessory interest. In effect the release of the interest extinguished it. The second exception was an outgrowth of the doctrine of
estoppel by deed.' 4 If A, the owner of the contingent interest, conveyed it
by warranty deed to B and the contingency upon which the estate was to
vest later occurred, the interest vested in A only for a moment and then
passed through him to his grantee. A and his privies would be estopped
to derogate from his deed to B. It is to be noted that a warranty deed was
necessary; a quitclaim generally would not suffice."; The third exception
was developed in chancery. If there was an attempted inter vivos transfer
of a contingent interest which later became vested, equity would treat the
transfer as a contract to convey and would specifically enforce it if there
was sufficient consideration. 6 In any of these situations the grantee got
only what the grantor had, so that if the contingency was never fulfilled
or if the interest was void or destroyed, the grantee took nothing.
Many of the early American cases recognized and applied the common
17
law principles and even today there are states that give deference to them.
"[Ilt seems clear that a contingent remainder is an interest not capable of
being transferred or mortgaged, nor can it be sold under execution for debt."18
12. See Lampet's Case, 10 Co. Rep. 46(b), 77 Eng. Rep. 994 (KB. 1613); Doe
dern. Christmas v. Oliver, 10 B. & C. 181, 109 Eng. Rep. 418 (K.B. 1829); Crofts v.
Middleton, 8 De G. M. & G. 192, 44 Eng. Rep. 364 (Ch. 1856); 4 KENT, Co
xtasTARIES 295 (1896) ; MOY1,IHAN, A PRELIMINARY SuRVEY OF THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY

73 (1940); 2 WASHBURN, REAL PROPERTY 527 (6th ed. 1902).
13. 10 Co. Rep. 46(b), 77 Eng. Rep. 994 (KB. 1613).

14. See Doe dem. Christmas v. Oliver, 10 B. & C. 181, 109 Eng. Rep. 418 (KB.
1829).
15. 3 SImEs, FUTURE INTERESTS
(3d ed. 1939).

§ 710 (1936) ; 2

TIFFANY, RE.AL PROPERTY

§ 341

16. Crofts v. Middleton, 8 De G. M. & G. 192, 44 Eng. Rep. 364 (Ch. 1856).
17. See, egg., Love v. McDonald, 201 Ark. 882, 148 S.W.2d 170 (1941); Kohl v.
Montgomery, 373 II. 200, 25 N.E.2d 826 (1940); Du Bois v. Judy, 291 Ill. 340, 126
N.E. 104 (1920); Schapiro v. Howard, 113 Md. 360, 78 Atl. 58 (1910); Godwin v.
Banks, 87 Md. 425, 40 Atl. 268, 273 (1898); Jackson ex dent. Varick v. Waldron, 13

Wend. 178 (N.Y. 1834).

18. Love v. McDonald, 201 Ark. 882, 148 S.W.2d 170, 174 (1941).
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NOTES

Those states that refuse to condone the outright transfer of a contingent in2
20
19
terest permit a conveyance by release, estoppel or equitable assignment. '
A few states have abrogated the common law by judicial decision without the
aid of statute. Pennsylvania did so in 189222 and in 1915 an Oregon court
declared, "Under the more modern doctrine all estates in land, whether in
fee or remainder, may be conveyed by deed. Some of the authorities hold that
such deeds operate only equitably by way of estoppel, and others, that the
contingent interest passes directly. The latter we think the better rule.
These cases appear to make the proper distinction between a
. ."23
*
presently existing contingent interest and a mere possibility or expectancy
of acquiring an estate in the future. "A bare possibility cannot be transferred at law; but by a possibility we mean the interest or chance of
succession which an heir apparent has in his ancestor's estate. . . . They
are uncertain interests and are the true technical possibilities of the common
law.... But executory devises and contingent remainders are not considered
24
as mere possibilities, but as certain interests and estates."
Some authorities on future interests indicate that Tennessee falls in
that category of states in which contingent interests are alienable by virtue
of statute.25 The Tennessee Code provides, ". . . and every grant or devise
or real estate, or any interest therein, shall pass all the estate or interest of
the grantor or devisor, unless the intent to pass a less estate or interest
shall appear by express terms, or be necessarily implied in the terms of
the instrument.126 Two cases indicate that this statute makes contingent
future interests alienable. 27 For a time the law appeared to be unsettled
in view of expressions in some of the earlier cases that such interests were
nontransferrable. 28 But in 1947 the Tennessee Supreme Court clarified
the matter in Hobson v. Hobson.29 There a son was a contingent remainder19. Bartholomew v. Murray, 61 Conn. 387, 23 At. 604 (1891) ; Williams v. Esten,
179 Ill. 267, 53 N.E. 562 (1899); McWilliams v. Havely, 214 Ky. 320, 283 S.W.
103 (1926).
20. Smith v. Carroll, 286 Ill. 137, 121 N.E. 254 (1918) ; Thames v. Goode, 217
N.C. 639, 9 S.E.2d 485 (1940).
21. McAdams v. Bailey, 169 Ind. 518, 82 N.E. 1057, 1059 (1907). See also Bishop
v. Horney, 177 Md. 353, 9 A.2d 597 (1939); Watson v. Smith, 110 N.C. 6, 14 S.E.

640 (1892).

22. Whelen v. Phillips, 151 Pa. 312, 25 Atl. 44 (1892).
23. Love v. Lindstedt, 76 Ore. 66, 147 Pac. 935, 937 (1915).

24. Beacom v. Amos, 161 N.C. 357, 77 S.E. 407, 411 (1913).
25. See 3 SIms, FUTURE INTERESTS § 713 (1936); Roberts, Transfer of Future

Interests, 30 MIcH. L. REv. 349 (1932).
26. TENN. CoDE ANN. § 7597 (Williams 1934).
27. Frank v. Frank, 153 Tenn. 215, 280 S.W. 1012 (1925); Bruce v. Goodbar,
104 Tenn. 638, 58 S.W. 282 (1900). See also Mullens v. Mullens, 5 Tenn. App. 235

(M.S. 1927).

28. See Rutherford v. Rutherford, 116 Tenn. 383, 387, 92 S.W. 1112, 15 Am. St.
Rep. 799 (1906); Nichols v. Guthrie, 109 Tenn. 535, 73 S.W. 107 (1902); Turner
v. Ivie, 52 Tenn. 222, 236 (1871).
29. 184 Tenn. 484, 201 S.W.2d 659 (1947).
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man under the will of his father. He executed a deed of trust conveying to
his creditor his interest under the will. At his mother's death, her administrator sued the creditor to have the trust deed set aside, alleging that
the son was her debtor and that his attempted conveyance of the contingent
remainder was void since such interests were inalienable. In holding for the
defendant-creditor the-court declared that a contingent remainder is a mere
expectancy and not an estate and that it could not be conveyed at common
law except by way of estoppel. The decision was put upon the express
ground that the defendant gave consideration and that the transfer would
be treated in equity as a contract to sell. The language implied that the
Tennessee statute is not applicable and that there is no general capacity
freely to sell a contingent interest. The case does fit Tennessee into one
of the common law escape methods designed to avoid the nonalienability rule.
Although these interests may not be alienated in the usual manner, they
may be released to the owner of the possessory interest.3 0 A warranty deed
will later estop the grantor to derogate from his grant 3' and equity will en2
force such transfers as contracts to sell if supported by consideration.a
A distinction has been made between those interests that are contingent as to persons who are to take upon fulfillment of tie contingency
and those interests that are contingent as to the event. When the persons
to take have been ascertained and the contingency is with respect to the
event, there is an indication that the interest may be alienated inter vivos3 3
But when the interest is contingent in the sense that the parties to take are
not yet ascertained, it is not transferrable because there is no one to pass
title.3 4 There is language in Bruce v. Goodbar35 indicating that if the contingency is with respect to the person to take, the interest may not be
released. No other Tennessee case has been found to support this expression
of dictum and its vitality is questionable.
To be perfectly safe, the Tennessee conveyancer would do well to use
one of the three methods of transfer outlined above in conveying a contingent
30. JohnAon v. Osment, 108 Tenn. 32, 65 S.W. 23 (1901) ; Garner v. Dowling, 58
Tenn. 48 (1872).
31. Frank v. Frank, 153 Tenn. 215, 280 S.W. 1012 (1925); Nichols v. Guthrie,
109 Tenn. 535, 73 S.W. 107 (1902); Bruce v. Goodbar, 104 Tenn. 638, 58 S.W. 282
(1900); Ankenbauer v. Ankenbauer, 6 Tenn. App. 221 (M.S. 1927); see Hobson v.
Hobson, 184 Tenn. 484, 493, 201 S.W.2d 659, 663 (1947).
32. Hobson v. Hobson, 184 Tenn. 484, 201 S.W.2d 659 (1947). See Taylor v.
Swafford, 122 Tenn. 303, 123 S.W. 350, 25 L.R.A. (N.s.) 442 (1909), where the
Court said equity would specifically enforce a contract for the sale of an expectancy
of an heir if supported by consideration. A fortiori, it would enforce a sale of a contingent interest.
33. Frank v. Frank, 153 Tenn. 215, 280 S.W. 1012 (1925); Bruce v. Goodbar,
104 Tenn. 638, 58 S.W. 282 (1900). See also Du Bois v. Judy, 291 IMI.340, 126 N.H.
104 (1920) ; Kennedy v. Rutter, 110 Vt. 332, 6 A.2d 17, 23 (1939).
34. Nichols v. Guthrie, 109 Tenn. 535, 73 S.W. 107 (1902).
35. 104 Tenn. 638, 643, 58 S.W. 282, 283 (1900).
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interest, regardless of whether the contingency is with respect to the person
or the event. It is particularly important that a warranty deed with covenants
of title be used if the transfer is to a stranger. Otherwise, there may be no
estoppel.
Numerous reasons can be advanced favoring the alienability of these
contingent interests. They are by definition presently existing interests in
property. Unlike medieval England, ours is a commercial world in which
the emphasis is upon transferability of property rights. The modern tendency
of the law is to shift the emphasis from common law technicalities based on
the feudal system to marketability consistent with the commercial practices of
1951. A man should be allowed to dispose of any property interest regardless of its expectant character. England, the source of the rule against
alienability, has abolished it by statute. The Restatement of Property takes
the position that contingent interests are alienable inter vivos 3o and this is
the rule in most states today. On the other hand, a great deal can be said in
favor of the nonalienability rule. To allow outright transfer may defeat the
intent of the grantor or devisor. These interests are not vested but are mere
expectancies, and the law should not adopt the attitude of favoring land
transactions in such expectancies. The rule, however, is really not as harsh
as it would at first blush appear. Most all situations requiring transfer of
these interests are such as can be satisfied by one of the three exceptions.
Any harshness in the rule exists primarily in the sense that it represents a
trap for the unwary lawyer.3 7
3. Possibilitiesof Reverter and Rights of Re-entry
Many courts have unfortunately failed to make the proper distinction
between possibilities of reverter and rights of re-entry for condition broken,
and these interests have been confused on too many occasions. A possibility
of reverter arises when the grantor conveys a fee simple determinable. 38
Although not a vested reversion, it is in the nature of a reversionary interest.
The words generally used to create a determinable fee are "so long as . . .
and no longer," "until such time as," "while" and other comparable language
which indicates that the fee is to terminate upon the happening of the named
event.30 It is particularly important to note that when the determinable
fee terminates, the estate automatically reverts to the grantor or his suc36. RESTATEM ExT, PROPERTY § 162 (1936).
37. For other comments on alienability of future interests see Reno, Alienability
and Transmissibility of Future Interests in Maryland, 2 MD. L. REv. 89 (1938) ;
Roberts, Recent Kentucky Cases on Future Interests, 21 Ky. L.J. 217 (1933) ; Roberts,
Transfer of Future Interests, 30 MicH. L. Rgv. 349 (1932); Notes, 22 IowA L. REV.
696 (1937), 25 N.D. BAR BRIEFs 124 (1949), 21 ORE. L. REv. 81 (1941).
38. 1 SimEs, FUTURE INTERESTS § 177 (1936); 1 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 220
(1939).
39. 1 SI Es, FUTURE INTERESTS § 181 (1936).
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cessors without any further act by the grantor. In this respect, there is an
essential difference between the possibility of reverter and the right of reentry. 40 Any increments or profits accruing to the land between the event
which terminates the determinable fee and the assertion of right on the
grantor's part inure to the benefit of the grantor. On the other hand, a right
of re-entry is a power retained by the grantor when he conveys a fee simple
on a condition subsequent.4 1 Such a conveyance passes the entire fee and
leaves the grantor or his heirs only a right to re-enter if the condition
subsequent is broken. In order to terminate the grantee's estate and revest
42
it in the grantor, some act of re-entry or action by the grantor is necessary.
A fee simple on a condition subsequent is created by the use of any language
which shows the existence of a condition subsequent. ,The Restatement
calls this right of re-entry a "power of termination. 4
Possibility of Reverter. The authorities seem to agree that at early
common law possibilities of reverter were not alienable by an inter vivos
transfer.4 4 These interests were looked upon as mere possibilities or expectancies. "It is well settled that under the common law a mere possibility of
reverter is not an estate, present or future, but a possibility of having an
estate; that possibilities of reverter were inalienable at common law by deed
or will, since such a right arises out of a grant so limited that it may last
forever or terminate on a contingency, and is a mere possibility of having
45
the fee again. ....
.

There is a distinct split of authority on the alienability of possibilities
of reverter today.4 6 The Restatement takes the position that this interest
may be transferred by an inter vivos conveyance. 4 7 Those states that adhere
to this view probably look upon the possibility of reverter as a reversionary
40. Id. § 177.

41. Id. § 159.
42. Id. § 160.
43. RES7ATEMENT, PROPERTY § 155 (1936).
44. See Battistone v. Banulski, 110 Conn. 267, 147 Atl. 820, 821 (1929); Davis v.
Austin, 348 Mo. 1094, 156 S.W.2d 903, 905 (1941); County School Board v. Dowell,
190 Va. 676, 58 S.E.2d 38, 43 (1950). See also 2 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 314
(1939) ; Roberts, Assignability of Possibilities of Reverter and Rights of Re-entry, 22
B.U.L. REv. 43 (1942).
45. Ricks v. Merchants Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 191 Miss. 323, 2 So.2d 344, 345
(1941).
46. For alienability: Reclamation Dist. v. Van Loben Sels, 145 Cal. 181, 78 Pac.
638 (1904) (implication); Battistone v. Banulski, 110 Conn. 267, 147 Atl. 820 (1929)
(statute); Irby v. Smith, 147 Ga. 329, 93 S.E. 877 (1917); Fall Creek Township v.
Shuman, 55 Ind. App. 232, 103 N.E. 677 (1913); Slegel v. Herbine, 148 Pa. 236, 23
At. 996 (1892) ; Calhoun v. Hays, 155 Pa. Super. 519, 39 A.2d 307 (1944) ; County
School Board v. Dowell, 190 Va. 676, 58 S.E.2d 38 (1950) (statute).
Against alienability: Cookman v. Silliman, 22 Del. Ch. 303, 2 A.2d 166 (Ch. 1938)
Regular Predestinarian Baptist Church v. Parker, 373 Ill. 607, 27 N.E.2d 522, 137
A.L.R. 635 (1940); O'Donnell v. Robson, 239 Ill. 634, 88 N.E. 175 (1909); Blue v.
Wilmington, 186 N.C. 321, 119 S.E. 741 (1923).
47. RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 159, comment a (1936).
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interest and, compare it with the reversion which is a vested interest alienable
inter vivos. The states which still follow the common law regard it as a
mere possibility. It has already been noted that several states have statutes
dealing with nonvested future interests. 48 Those statutes- which declare
"all future interests" to be alienable inter vivos probably include possibilities
of reverter.49 However, those that make all "estates" alienable probably
would not include this interest in view of the courts' reluctance to classify
the possibility of reverter as an "estate." 50 Even in those states that hold
that a possibility of reverter is not alienable in the ordinary manner, the
conveyancer has two methods of, effecting such a transfer. As late as 1941
the Illinois Supreme Court indicated that when the owner of a possibility
of reverter attempts to convey it, his deed passes nothing to the grantee
at that time but if the determinable fee is later terminated so that the estate
reverts to the grantor, he: will be estopped to derogate from his prior grant.5'
This estoppel presupposes the existence of a warranty deed. A second
method available to the conveyancer is a 'release to the owner of the determinable fee.5 2 The determinable fee and the possibility of ,reverter merge so
as to extinguish the possibility and vest an absolute fee simple in the grantee.
A distinction must be made between those transfers of the original
grantor's interest attempted before the determinable fee has terminated and
those made afterwards. When the event which is to terminate the determinable fee occurs, the estate automatically reverts to the grantor. He then
has a present possessory interest which can, be transferred as any comparable
possessory interest. 3 . It is of extreme importance that the distinction between
possibilities of reverter and rights. of re-entry be kept in mind because an
attempted inter vivos transfer of a possibility .has no effect upon it,, As we
shall see later, an attempted conveyance of a right of re-entry destroys it.
Tennessee recognizes both possibilities of reverter5 4 and rights of reentry. 5 'Although the language of some cases confuses the two, they are
generally treated as separate and distinct interests. The leading case on
possibilities of reverter is Yarbkough v. Yarbrough." Alex Yarbrough
48. See page 80 supra.
49. 3 SimEs, FUTURE INTERESTS § 715 (1936).
50. Ibid.
51. Pure Oil Co. v. Miller-McFarland Drilling Co.,, 376 Ill. 486, 34 N.E.2d 854,
135 A.L.R. 567 (1941).
52. Burche v. Neal, 107 W. Va. 559, 149 S.E. 611 (1929) (implication).
53. See North v. Graham, 235 Ill. 178, 85 N.E. 267 (1908); Magness v. Kerr,
121 Ore. 373, 254 Pac. 1012 (1927).
54. See Yarbrough v. Yarbrough, 151 Tenn. 221, 269 S.W. 36 (1924); Overton
v. Lea, 108 Tenn. 505, 68 S.W. 250 (1902).
55. See Board of Education v. Baker, 124 Tenn. 39, 134 S.W. 863 (1910); Lunsden
v. Payne, 120 Tenn. 407, 114 S.W. 483, 21 L.R.A. (N.s.) 605 (1907); Newman v.
Ashe, 68 Tenn. 380 (1876).
56. 151 Tenn. 221, 269 S.W. 36 (1924).
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conveyed property to a church for church purposes only, "To have and to
hold.., so long as used for the purposes hereinabove stated," and when the
property ceased to be so used, it was to revert "back to the original tract of
land." In 1913 he conveyed the property to Huggins who in turn conveyed
to Mack Yarbrough. In 1918 the property ceased to be used for church
purposes and the trustees gave it to Mack Yarbrough. Two years later
Alex conveyed all his interest to Huggins and the two sued Mack in ejectment to regain the premises. The supreme court construed the original
grant as creating a determinable fee in the church with an attempted gift
over to whoever might be the owner of the tract when the fee terminated.
The attempted gift over was an executory interest which the court held to
be void because it violated the Rule against Perpetuities. A possibility of
reverter remained in the grantee and the court held that this could not be
alienated by an inter vivos transfer. Hence, the 1913 deed to Huggins and
the subsequent deed to Mack Yarbrough passed nothing. When the estate
terminated, it automatically reverted to Alex and his 1920 deed to Huggins
conveyed the entire fee.
Right of Re-entry. The common law treated the right of re-entry like
the possibility of reverter and refused to allow its alienation inter vivos.1
"It is of the essence of an estate on condition, that the right to enter for a
breach of the condition is reserved to the grantor and his heirs. It cannot
be reserved to strangers .... A mere right of entry could not be conveyed

at common law. It would be contrary to the ancient well settled rule that
'nothing in action, entry or re-entry, can be granted over....'

It contravenes

the policy of the law, which does not permit the buying or selling of pretended
or disputed titles, or rights to real estate, which rest wholly in action." 8
Various reasons have been advanced to support this ruleY0 The rule arose
at a time when legal scholars would not countenance the transfer of a mere
right unattached to something tangible. Some authorities maintain that to
allow such rights to be transferred inter vivos would tend to clog land titles
or thwart the grantor's intent. Perhaps the most significant reason given
is to prevent champerty and maintenance. The great weight of authority

today follows the common law.60 But at least seven states have statutes
57. Strothers v. Woodcox, 142 Iowa 648, 121 N.W. 51 (1909); Rice v. Boston &
Worcester R.R., 94 Mass. (12 Allen) 141 (1866) ; Guild v. Richards, 82 Mass. (16
Gray) 309 (1860); Helms v. Helms, 137 N.C. 206, 49 S.E. 110 (1904); MOYNIHAN,
SuRVEY O' REAL PROPERTY 56 (1940); 2 POWELL, REAL PRonERTY 485 (1950); Core,
Transmissibility of Certain Contingent Future Interests, 5 ARK. L. REV. 111 (1951);
Roberts, Assignability of Possibilities of Reverter and Rights of Re-entry, 22 B.UY.L.
REV. 43 (1942).
58. Guild v. Richards, 82 Mass. (16 Gray) 309, 317 (1860).
59. See Core, Transmissibility of Certain Contingent Future Interests, 5 AaK. L.
REv. 111 (1951).
60. See Ruch v. Rock Island. 97 U.S. 693, 24 L. Ed. 1101 (1878); Ralston v.
Hatfield, 81 Ind. App. 641, 143 N.E. 887 (1924); Dyer v. Siano, 298 Mass. 537, 11
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expressly declaring rights of re-entry to be alienable inter vivos. 1 Those
statutes declaring all future interests to be alienable may include the right
of re-entry, but it is likely to be excluded from the operation of those allowing
'62
the transfer of all "estates.
There are two exceptions to this non-alienability rule. A right of reentry may be released to the owner of the fee simple on condition subsequent
upon the theory that such release tends to clear the title.63 When the right
of re-entry accompanies a reversion, it may be alienated along with the
reversion. 4 These two interests are concomitants in leases.
In Newman v. Ashe, 65 the Tennessee Supreme Court, referring to
rights of re-entry, said by way of dictum that, ".

.

. the authorities hold that

the right to enter or avoid the deed is reserved- only to the bargainer or
7
''
his heirs, and does not pass to his grantee.!o Board of Education v. Baker
is the leading case on the subject. One Simpson conveyed property to the
Board's predecessor in 1881. Although the language of the habendum looks
as if it created a determinable fee, the court treated it as a fee simple on
condition subsequent with a right of re-entry remaining in the grantor. In
1887 and 1907 Simpson conveyed the property to Baker and when he went
into possession, the Board sought to eject him. The lower court found as
a fact that there had been no abandonment of the premises but decreed that
when the property was abandoned, it should go to Baker because of the
deeds to him. The Board appealed on this point and the Supreme Court
reversed, holding that the right of re-entry left in Simpson was not alienable
inter vivos because it was a bare possibility and such possibilities may not
be sold. In addition to this, the court vested the absolute fee in the Board
saying, ".

.

. it is clear that the conveyance by Simpson to Baker was a

relinquishment of his right of re-entry and an election upon his part not
to exercise it ....,,68
N.E.2d 451 (1937); Juif v. Dillman, 287 Mich. 35, 282 N.W. 892 (1938); Halpin v.

Rural Agricultural School Dist., 224 Mich. 308, 194 N.W. 1005 (1923), 22 MIcH. L.
REv. 271 (1924); Trustees of Calvary Presbyterian Church v. Putnam, 221 App. Div.
502, 224 N.Y. Supp. 651 (4th Dep't 1927); O'Connor v. Saratoga Springs, 146 Misc.
892, 262 N.Y. Supp. 809 (Sup. Ct. 1933); RESTATMFENT, PROPERTY § 160 (1936);

3 SIMES, FuztUm INTERESTS § 716 (1936).
61. CAL. CIrV. CoDE § 1046 (1945); CoNN. GEN. REv. STAT. § 5033 (1930); IDAHO
CoDE ANN. § 54-502 (1932); MicH. Comp. LAws § 12966-2 (Supp. 1940); MoNT.
REV. CoDEs § 6839 (1939); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:3-7 (1946); R.I. GEN. LAws, c.

433, § 10 (1938).
62. 3 SIbES, FUTURE INTERESTS § 716 (1936).
63. Trustees of Calvary Presbyterian Church v. Putnam, 221 App. Div. 502, 224
N.Y. Supp. 651 (4th Dep't 1927); Note, 3 ST. JoHN's L. Rrv. 124 (1928); 27 MicH.
L. REv. 346 (1929).

64. Gwynn v. Jones' Lessee,
89 Mass. (7 Allen) 109 (1863)
65. 68 Tenn. 380 (1876).
66. Id. at 385.
67. 124 Tenn. 39, 134 S.W.
68. Id. at 48, 49, 134 S.W.

2 Gill & J. 173 (Md. 1830). But cf. Trask v. Wheeler,
(implication).
863 (1910).
at 866.
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. Atkins v. Gillespie 69 illustrates that both the possibility of reverter and
the right of re-entry might be released. The court referring to both of these
interests as a "possibility of reverter" said, "We are of the opinion that this
'possibility of reverter' may be released to the person or persons in whom
the fee-simple title is vested, by those persons who answer the description of
heirs at law of the grantor at the time of the execution of the release, and
who would have the right to the estate if the condition should be broken,
or the determinable fee should determine, at that time." 70 Dictum in Fowlkes
v. Wagoner7' supports this position.
Only a few states have holdings on the effect of an attempt to convey a
right of re-entry, but most of those that have expressed opinions have emphatically held that such an attempt destroys the interest and vests the
absolute fee in the original grantee. 72 The landmark case in point is Rice
v. Boston & Worcester R.R. 73 This was an action for a writ of entry. The
demandant's father had conveyed the property to the railroad which was
to hold upon condition that it would maintain a pass-way and certain fences.
Before his death the father had attempted to convey his interest to the
demandant who sought to regain the premises in this suit when the conditions
were broken. In its decision in favor of the railroad the Massachusetts
court, after stating that a right of re-entry could not be conveyed by an inter
vivos transfer, held that an attempted conveyance destroyed the interest and
veted the .absolute title in the original grantee. Since the right of re-entry
is not alienable, the grantee gets nothing by the deed. Neither the grantor
nor his privies will be allowed to assert the right because they cannot derogate
from the deed of the interest. Since there is no one to assert the right, it is
in effect extinguished. It is noteworthy that the demandant was the heir of
the grantor and in the absence of the attempted inter vivos transfer to him,
the right would have descended to him and he could have asserted it later.
In this case, however, nothing descended because the attempted transfer
destroyed the interest. The Restatement of Property originally took the positionof the Rice case, 74 but the 1948 Supplement lays down the rule that an attempted conveyance does not destroy the right of re-entry.7
Reliance for
the change is placed upon the lack of historical precedent and the "recent
69. 156 Tenn. 137, 299 S.W. 776 (1927).
70. Id. at 142, 299 S.W. at 778.
71. 46 S.W. 586, 592 (Tenn. Ch. 1898).
72. Union Colony Co. v. Gallie, 104 Colo. 46, 88 P.2d 120 (1939); Dyer v.
Siano, 298 Mass. 537, 11 N.E.2d 451 (1937); Rice v. Boston & Worcester R.R., 94
Mass. (12 Allen) 141 (1866); Juif v. Dillman, 287 Mich. 35, 28Z N.W. 892 (1938);
Halpin v. Rural Agricultural School Dist., 224 Mich. 308, 194 N.W. 1005 (1923), 22
MicH. L. REv. 271 (1924); O'Connor v. City of Saratoga Springs, 146 Misc. 892,
262 N.Y. Supp. 809 (Sup. Ct. 1933) ; Board of Education v. Baker, 124 Tenn. 39, 134
S.W. 863 (1910).

73. 94 Mass. (12 Allen) 141 (1866).
74. RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 160, comment c (1936).
75. RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 160, comment c (Supp. 1948).
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judicial trend"' 6 as expressed by the case of Jones v. Oklahoma City.77
Although it is true that this case held that an attempt to alienate did not
destroy the right of re-entry, it was a 5-4 decision. The cases cited by the
majority involved possibilities of reverter and did not stand for the proposition for which they were cited. Nevertheless, the Jones case is a living
example of the vitality of the common law and represents, along with the
new position of the Restatement, a definite development in the field of future
interests. To what extent this view will be adopted by other jurisdictions
is conjecture, but it is likely to be received with favor in those states that
have not yet passed on the issue directly. It is not possible to predict whether
states like Tennessee and Massachusetts that have passed directly on the
question will adopt the Restatement's position or follow their precedents.
The new position of the American Law Institute appears to be the sounder
view. An attempted transfer of a possibility of reverter or any other contingent interest is simply null and void. It does not operate to destroy the
interest. As one court has put it by way of dictum, "It seems rather fantastic to us, that a conveyance which is ineffective to convey what it attempts
to convey is nevertheless an effective means of destroying it."8 The same
policy considerations exist with respect to all contingent future interests.
To permit an attempted transfer to destroy the right of re-entry amounts
to nothing more than a forefeiture. Regardless of these arguments, it is to
be noted that the present status of the law in those other states which have
passed on the issue is that the attempted conveyance destroys the interest. 79
Several reasons have been advanced as to why possibilities of reverter
and rights of re-entry should be alienable inter vivos. 80 The fear of dangers
arising from the sale of lawsuits has long since abated, and maintenance and
champerty are no longer a nightmare to the courts. There are more practical
advantages in allowing such transfers in that they enhance marketability and
are highly desirable methods of clearing titles to property. There may be
occasions on which an owner of one of these interests is in need of ready
cash and to prevent a conversion of this intangible interest to cash may
represent a definite inconvenience. On the other hand such interests are
not vested but are mere possibilities or expectancies. To allow a sale by
voluntary transfer is in effect to allow a wager to be placed upon the contingency or event which would terminate the estate. Some authorities indicate
that the possibility of reverter is inalienable since it is not subject to the
Rule against Perpetuities and to prevent its voluntary transfer reduces
76. Ibid.
77. 193 Okla. 637, 145 P.2d 971 (1943).
78. Reichard v. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R., 231 Iowa 563, 1 N.W.2d 721, 729 (1942).
79. See note 72 supra.
80. See Roberts, Assignability of Possibilities of Reverter antd Rights of Re-entry,
22 B.U.L. REv. 43 (1942).
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its nuisance value.81 Despite these arguments, pro and con, the law is well
settled in most states, including Tennessee, that rights of re-entry are not
alienable. Although there is a more divergent split of authority on possibilities of reverter, most states, including Tennessee, appear to treat them as
inalienable.
II. RIGHTS OF CREDITORS
Closely related to the material that has just been discussed is the
problem of the extent to which creditors may satisfy their claims out of
their debtor's future interests. It is not the purpose of this Note to discuss
the various local procedures for satisfying these claims. Suffice it to say
that the primary methods are: (1) a writ of execution issued in favor of a
judgment creditor; (2) attachment of the interests to insure payment of any
judgment that might be rendered; (3) a creditor's bill in equity; (4) claims
filled with the trustee in bankruptcy of a bankrupt debtor; and (5) claims
filed against the estate of a deceased debtor. "2' Today all these methods, with
the possible exception of the bill in equity, are largely statutory. Only a
few statutes make any reference to future interests83 so that the problem of
whether they fall within the scope of the statutes is primarily a matter of
judicial decision.
The criterion which has been established to determine whether a particular future interest may be seized by a creditor is its attribute of voluntary
inter vivos transfer. If the owner could, by a voluntary inter vivos transfer,
convey the interest, creditors of the owner may levy upon the interest to
satisfy their claims. 84 This is the view taken by the Restatement with respect
to executions85 and attachments8 6 and appears to be the overwhelming weight
81. See 3 SlimEs, FurUR INTERESTS § 715 (1936). For an excellent discussion
of the Rule against Perpetuities in Tennessee see Warner, The Rule Against Perpetuities, 21 TENN. L. Rzv. 641 (1951).
82. 2 PowE L, REAL PROPERTY 514 (1950) ; 3 SIatzs, FUTURE INTERESTS 186 et seq,

(1936).
83. At least three states have statutes restricting sale or execution to vested future
interests: ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 519 (1945); OHIo CODE ANN. § 11655 (1940);

Wyo. CotP. STAT.

§ 3-4201 (1945).

84. Horton v. Moore, 110 F.2d 189 (6th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 692
(1940) ; Gaffney v. Shepard, 108 Conn. 339, 143 Atl. 236 (1928) ; Aetna Life Ins. Co.
v. Hoppin, 249 Ill. 406, 94 N.E. 669 (1911); Noonan v. State Bank of Livermore,
211 Iowa 401, 233 N.W. 487 (1930); In re Cunningham's Estate, 340 Pa. 265, 16
A.2d 712 (1940); Albergotti v. Summers, 205 S.C. 179, 31 S.E.2d 129 (1944); 2
PowEu., REAL PROPERTY 517 (1950); 3 SImEs, FUTURE INTERESTS § 736 (1936). In
order to alleviate certain hardships on the debtor, the Washington court has very
admirably declared that even though a creditor may levy on the interest, a sale of

the interest will be postponed until it becomes possessory so that the rights of both

parties will be safeguarded. Mears v. Lamona, 17 Wash. 148, 49 Pac. 251 (1897).
This practice is recommended by the writer if the interest is likely to become possessory

in the near future.
85.

RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY §

86. Id. § 167.

166 (1936).
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of authority. Creditors of a deceased debtor may file a claim against the
interest if it vested at the debtor's death and became alienable at that time,
even though it could not be alienated during his lifetime.8 7 Of course if it
was alienable within his lifetime, it could be seized under the "alienability"
rule. In those jurisdictions where contingent future interests are alienable
only by way of release, estoppel or equitable assignment, the interest is beyond
the creditor's reach.88 Logically, this result is proper. A creditor to whom
a voluntary release would be effective should not be able to force one, and
thus occupy a priority position over other creditors. With regard to estoppel
or equitable assignment, the basic theory is that nothing passes until the
interest vests and becomes alienable. Under the above rules vested future
interests could always be the subject of levy. s9
This criterion of transferability has been adopted in the Federal Bankruptcy Act. Under this Act, a trustee in bankruptcy is vested by operation
of law with title to all property interests the bankrupt "could by any means
have transferred" during life or which might have been levied upon by
creditors." ° The law of the state which governs the interest determines its
alienability. 91 There is some conflict in the authorities as to whether a contingent future interest alienable only by way of release, estoppel or equitable
assignment is an interest which the bankrupt "could by any means have
2
transferred." Most cases hold that such interests do not pass to the trustee
but the rule of the seventh circuit is contrary. 93 The latter view seems to be
unwise in view of the fact that such interests are not leviable under state
processes. This puts a premium on bankruptcy proceedings with its concomitant expenses and slight gain to the creditor.
Tennessee appears to follow the majority rules with respect to creditors'
rights. The attachment and execution statutes fail to throw any light on the
87.

RESTATEMENT,

FUTU E INTERESTS

PROPERTY

§ 39 (1951).

§ 169(1),(2)(b)

(1936);

SIMEs,

HANDBOOK

ON

88. Plumlee v. Bounds, 118 Ark. 247, 176 S.W. 140 (1915); Aetna Life Ins.
Co. v. Hoppin, 249 Ill. 406, 94 N.E. 669 (1911); RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY §§ 167(2),
166, comment a (1936) ; 3 SImEs, FUTURE INTERESTS § 738 (1936).
89. See e.g., Williams v. Spears, 235 Ala. 611, 180 So. 266 (1938); Pound v.

Faulkner, 193 Ga. 413, 18 S.E.2d 749 (1942); Peters v. Thoning, 231 Iowa 755, 2
N.W.2d 76 (1942); Perabo v. Gallagher, 241 Mass. 207, 135 N.E. 113 (1922) (implication); Sanders v. Jones, 347 Mo. 255, 147 S.W.2d 424 (1940); Riverside Trust
Co. v. Twitchell, 342 Pa. 558, 20 A.2d 768 (1941).

90. 52 STAT. 880 (1938), 11 U.S.C.A. § 110(a)(5) (Supp. 1950).
91. See In re Martin, 47 F.2d 498 (6th Cir. 1931) (Tennessee law); Suskin &
Berry, Inc. v. Rumley, 37 F.2d 304 (4th Cir. 1930) ; Noonan v. State Bank of Livermore,

211 Iowa 401, 233 N.W. 487 (1930).

92. See Kahn v. Rockhill, 132 N.J.Eq. 188, 28 A.2d 34 (Ch. 1942), aff'd, 31 A.2d
819 (Ct. Err. & App. 1943); Luttgen v. Tiffany, 37 R.I. 416, 93 AtI. 182 (1915);
RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 168, comment e (1936); 2 PowEr.L, REAL PROPERTY 519
(1950); 3 Si.tzs, FUTURE INTERESTS § 738 (1936).
93. See In re Landis, 41 F.2d 700 (7th Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 872
(1930); In re Reifsteck, 71 F. Supp. 157 (E.D. Ill. 1947) (district court reluctantly
followed the Landis case).
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subject. It has been held that vested remainders and reversions may be
levied upon by way of attachment or execution and that such interests pass
to a trustee in bankruptcy. 94 Since contingent future interests may not be
conveyed by an outright transfer, they are beyond the reach of creditors, even
though they may be alienated by release, estoppel or equitable assignment.90
9
In Nichols v. Guthrie
" a testator devised property to Elizabeth Sims for
life with remainder to her children living at her death. This gave the children
a contingent remainder. During Elizabeth's life, a judgment creditor of
Walter Sims, son of Elizabeth, caused execution to be levied on his interest
and there was a sale through which the defendant claimed title. Later
Walter sold his interest to his sister through whom the plaintiff claimed title.
In a suit for partition at the life tenant's death, the court gave judgment for
the plaintiff, holding that a contingent remainder is not subject to execution
so that the defendant had no interest. The rationale of the case was that
since such interests are not transferrable inter vivos, they are not subject
to claims of creditors even though they are alienable by release, estoppel
or equitable assignment. The plaintiff got title by estoppel. As late as 1939
the Tennessee Supreme Court held that contingent interests are not subject
to creditors' claims because they are not alienable inter vivos.9 7
Had it not been for the statutory interpretation in Nichols v. Guthrie,
Tennessee law could well have developed to the anomalous position that contingent future interests could be levied even though they are nontransferrable inter vivos. The Code provides that the terms "real estate" "real
property" and "lands" include land and "all rights thereto and interests
therein. 98s Other code sections provide that executions may issue against
lands 9 and that attachments may be levied upon real property. 100 These
three sections would appear to allow a creditor to reach contingent future
interests but Nichols v. Guthrie and First National Bank of Springfield v.
Pointer indicate that the statutes do not bring these interests within their
scope.
94. First Nat. Bank of Springfield v. Pointer, 174 Tenn. 472, 126 S.W.2d 335
(1939) ; Manhattan Savings Bank & Trust Co. v. Bedford, 161 Tenn. 187, 30 S.W.2d 227

(1930); Puryear v. Edmundson, 51 Tenn. 43 (1871); Kissom & Keeler v. Nelson,

49 Tenn. 4 (1870); Wiley v. Bridgman, 38 Tenn. 39 (1858); Lockwood & Co. v.
Nye, 32 Tenn. 307, 58 Am. Dec. 73 (1852); Kelly v. Morgan's Lessee, 11 Tenn. 347

(1832).
95. First Nat. Bank of Springfield v. Pointer, 174 Tenn. 472, 126 S.W.2d 335
(1939); Nichols v. Guthrie, 109 Tenn. 535, 73 S.W. 107 (1902). Sce Henderson v.
Hill, 77 Tenn. 25, 34 (1882).
96. 109 Tenn. 535, 73 S.W. 107 (1902).
97. First Nat. Bank of Springfield v. Pointer, 174 Tenn. 472, 126 S.W.2d 335
(1939).
98. TENN. CoDE ANN. § 15 (Williams 1934).

99. Id. § 8863.
100. Id. § 9451.
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NOTES

A great deal has been written concerning the policy considerations on
the rights of creditors to reach future interests. On the one hand, such rights
represent an asset of the debtor which he ought not be permitted to protect
behind the sanctity of futurity. ' This asset has a present value which, although
perhaps speculative, nevertheless gives the creditor something out of which
to satisfy his claim. The speculative character of these interests gives rise
to the opposing position. To allow contingent interests to be levied upon
may represent a dire sacrifice to the debtor and a windfall to the creditor if
and when the interest vests. Regardless of these policy arguments, the law
is well established that the rights of creditors depend upon the inter vivos
alienability of the interest. It is important that precedents be read against the
background of alienability existing at the time the dispute arose. An early
case denying a creditor's right to levy upon a nonvested ,future interest may,
in effect, have been overruled by a subsequent decision or statute allowing
alienability of the interest in question. If the law regarding alienability has
been changed, the law of creditors' rights changes with it and cases decided
prior to the change should not be controlling and indeed should have no legal
efficacy.
CONCLUSION

This study in Tennessee law shows that the state substantially follows
the early common law in dealing with the issues under consideration. In
this respect Tennessee differs in the over-all picture from most of the other
states, but as to rights of re-entry and possibilities of reverter, there are
a substantial number of states that reach comparable conclusions. The
exigencies of our modern society compel a re-evaluation of the basic theories
upon which the common law principles rest. Since the problem is not one
which is likely to create a great deal of public sentiment, statutory change
is not probable. In bringing about a closer integration between principles of
property law and our commercialized world, we must look to the court to
exercise its great common law heritage and change the law by judicial
decision.
ERNEST C. MATTHEWS,
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